The program to immunize 210 million Americans against swine flu failed. It set back the Federal government's relations with state health agencies, private physicians, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and the insurance industry. It increased mistrust of immunization programs and of government health programs in general.
The swine flu immunization program is over. There was no epidemic and as of July 5, 1977, the U.S. Center for Disease Control (CDC) reported that about 45 million people had been vaccinated against swine influenza. The Center had originally hoped to immunize 210 million.
There are two indications that the program failed, a direct one that can be recognized today and an indirect one that bears on future mass immunization campaigns. First, the goal of vaccinating more than 210 million Americans did not even come close to realization. The national program began October 1, 1976 . It was halted December 16, 1976, because about 200 people had come down with GuillainBarre syndrome, a very rare and usually temporary paralysis [1] .
The second effect is harder to pinpoint. But indications are that public mistrust of all immunization programs, and perhaps public health programs in general, is increasing. The backlash is ironic because when Congress was debating the program many of its proponents wanted to use it as a vehicle to promote immunization programs for childhood diseases [2] . They hoped to increase consciousness of vaccines of all kinds, make the swine flu program a showpiece for preventive medicine, and demonstrate how well the federal government could cooperate in health matters with private practitioners, with state and local services, with volunteers, and with drug manufacturers [3] .
The plan backfired. The newsletter of the N.Y. County Medical Society blasted the program as "a classic example of what can happen when politicians play around with the delivery of health care" [4] . When Joseph Califano, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, fired Dr. David Sencer, director of the CDC and a vigorous 645 from the beginning and reiterated by almost every witness at the congressional hearings: a decision had to be reached quickly if the vaccine were to be manufactured, tested, distributed and administered before the start of the flu season. HEW officials needed a decision before April 1, they said, to give industry time to develop a vaccine. Development required four to six months, and the start of immunization was slated for October 1, 1976 [9] . The time pressure was derived in large part from the lessons of previous pandemics and immunizations. While the program was debated, health officials kept drawing parallels with the 1918-19 pandemic of swine flu as well as with more recent epidemics to illustrate the seriousness of the disease and to remind legislators what the public health establishment can and should do to prevent epidemics.
The 1957 Asian flu and the 1968 Hong Kong flu reached epidemic proportions because even though enough vaccines were available, they were not administered in time. In 1957 49 million doses of vaccine were ready before the epidemic peaked but half were never used. There were delays in distributing it to local health agencies and, more important, there was no public response to the immunization campaign [10] .
The need to rally citizen support for an immunization drive was recognized early on.
Medical [13] . Second was a broader policy question pertaining to all public health programs-the question of liability. Court decisions in 1968 and 1974 had held drug manufacturers responsible for warning patients about vaccines used in community health clinics. In the absence of the usual doctor-patient relationship the manufacturer was liable for injury resulting from his vaccine [14] .
The pharmaceutical firms therefore demanded insurance to protect them against such claims as well as the anticipated barrage of baseless damage suits arising out of the ambitious program [15] . In a drive of this extent there would inevitably be patients breaking out in rashes or even suffering heart attacks after inoculation. Since the two events were associated in time the patient might blame his reaction on the vaccine and sue the manufacturer.
But their insurance companies cancelled coverage for flu vaccine. The pharmaceutical firms therefore insisted the government indemnify them. Other program participants also asked for protection against liability and malpractice suits [16] The 1976 swine flu virus had similar surface antigens to the virus that killed some 20 million people in the 1918-19 pandemic [22] . Because such an antigenic strain had not appeared for over 50 years, only a small fraction of the population was immune to it. Salk called this an immunity gap and based his justification of the program on it. He argued that people under 50 lacked the protective antibodies necessary to prevent infection if the 1918-like strain reappeared [23] .
Others questioned the analogy with 1918. Many of those deaths were attributed to secondary pneumonia, and the virus hit a population weakened by the European war and was spread by overcrowding and troop movements. And 60 years ago there were no antibiotics against secondary infections like pneumonia [24] .
The CDC feared the continuation of a historic pattern. Flu pandemics had occurred about once a decade (1946, 1957, 1968 ) and in each case had followed antigenic shifts in influenza A [25] . (After antigenic shift, the sudden and complete change in a virus's antigens, antibodies protective against the old strain are useless and epidemics can start.)
The Ft. Dix strain showed no exceptional virulence, however [26] . The one recruit who died from it would probably have survived had he not left his sickbed to embark on an army march [27] . Furthermore, 12 people in New Jersey died of A-Victoria flu, but that virus was not called a "killer," as was. the swine strain [28] .
The fifth scientific issue was the success of vaccines. Vaccines stimulate production of antibodies that neutralize the virus before it can enter millions of body cells. Because the antibody response is highly specific, to induce production of the right antibodies the patient must be injected with the viral strain that appears.
How successful had flu vaccines been? Different estimates appeared in the press and at the congressional hearings. Cooper claimed they are 90 percent effective if "the infecting virus matches the virus used in the vaccine" [29] . Other advocates said they can protect 70 to 80 percent of recipients [30] . Dr. Sidney Wolfe of Ralph Nader's Health Research Group countered that they had been shown 20 to 70 percent effective in past tests [31] . The head of the Bureau of Biologics admitted it is "questionable whether the use of vaccine had any detectable effect in either 1957 or 1968" [32] .
Flu vaccine fails for two reasons. It is defective if its virus does not match that spreading through the population. The 42 million doses given in 1962 were only 20 to 25 percent effective because virologists incorrectly predicted the strain that appeared, so the vaccine was not tailored to cope with that virus [33] .
The 1957 and 1968 vaccines, however, would have worked if enough people had received them. The other reason a flu vaccine fails is the inability of the health care system to organize itself in time to deal with a fast-spreading virus and to convince people to get shots.
Because the new strain was identified early, the first reason for possible failure was minimized. Congress and HEW had to evaluate how well the vaccine would work, of course, but they faced the more difficult task of deciding how well the public health establishment could run a program whose goal was to vaccinate 210 million people and of publicizing the need to receive the vaccine.
The speed with which the program was to be implemented presented unique problems. Opponents warned of the dangers of a crash production program and, in fact, Parke-Davis made two million doses of vaccine before the CDC found they had used a 1931 strain instead of the 1976 virus [34] . On June 21, 1976, the CDC discovered that the vaccine produced by all four manufacturers lacked one of its active components. The ideal flu vaccine should trigger the production of antibodies to do two things: hemagglutinin to stop the virus from penetrating cells, and neuraminidase to stop it from multiplying and spreading even if it does penetrate cells [35] .
The program's administrators asserted this loss was not serious. But as Phillip Boffey asked in Science, "What else could they say? That must be their stand with 150 million doses lacking it" [36] . Production was too far along for the manufacturers to examine their process to find where they had lost the second active component.
The Bureau of Biologics had, meanwhile, begun field trials with 5,000 volunteers to determine the vaccine's efficacy. Subjects ranging in age from 3 to 100 were given either the vaccine or a placebo. One dose gave most adults the desired antibody response with few side effects. It was remarkably easy to immunize people over 24, said the CDC. But of the four vaccines produced, two produced the antibody response in 90 percent of the adults while the other two produced it in only 75 percent [37] . The vaccines were neither uniform nor perfect.
Worse problems arose with younger recipients. Only half of those between 18 and 24 responded adequately to the dose effective for older adults. In children from 3 to 10, no dose gave enough protection without also inducing side effects ranging from headaches to convulsions [38] .
This defect was serious because school-age children are the principal spreaders of flu. If they could not be immunized the entire program might fail-once swine flu appeared it would probably be impossible to prevent it from spreading so widely and quickly it would reach epidemic proportions [39] .
Beyond determining the efficacy of the vaccine, the risks and benefits of the whole program had to be evaluated. What gets lost in post facto arguments is that the likelihood of a pandemic was never judged substantial even by the program's advocates. Most But the success of the campaign should not have depended on a catastrophic outbreak of swine flu. Instead, expanding the program into a wider immunization effort would have provided a more rational, more lasting measure of success, such as the number of children protected against polio, diphtheria, and tetanus.
Congress nevertheless appropriated the $135 million with the full realization that the chances of a large outbreak of swine flu were remote. They made the decision by balancing the risks and benefits of the mass immunization program. Any time such an evaluation is used to determine a course of action, one assumes all risks and benefits are taken into account. But in the swine flu decision some costs were overlooked, because the decision came so quickly and did not reflect the views of groups it might have, like consumer advocates and local health officials.
The April hearings represent the point of no return. By August Congress was understandably reluctant to question the wisdom of its earlier decision. By then it was easier to go along with the program, faults and all.
At the House hearings in March, the unanimity on the need for the program was complete. Cooper stressed the enormity of the 1918 pandemic [40] . Sencer added, "Never in the past have we isolated a completely new strain of flu that has not been followed by an epidemic flu" [41] .
Through the rest of Cooper's testimony runs a subtler argument. One question asked about swine flu is why this strain differed from other emergent strains. There is never any resistance to a new strain. So what justified the great plans for a program that would dwarf the polio program of the 1950s? Why did HEW want to vaccinate 210 million people instead of the 40 million high-risk people they usually do?
The swine flu program was different because the government made it different. It seized the opportunity to launch a major campaign because it felt the country had the scientific and organizational capacity for it and because identifying a new virus seven months before the flu season gave virologists their first chance to match vaccine to emerging virus.
Said Cooper on He did not limit his arguments to the direct benefits of a swine flu vaccine or assume there would be an epidemic without it. He also pointed out that even a limited outbreak would burden the health system. He cited indirect benefits, too: the program would increase awareness of preventive medicine, and its high visibility would make parents find out if their children's immunization was complete [49] .
Other opposing testimony raised legal and logistics questions, but not medical ones. Predicting future problems, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America warned that the government must indemnify them against liability for the quality of the vaccine since it was being produced according to strict government specifications [50] . State officials expected massive financial problems: although they planned to mobilize volunteers, they still feared they would be unable to run the swine flu program without crippling their other health programs [51] .
But Congress took testimony on the need and safety of the vaccine from almost every sector of the health industry. Cooper maintained that although the question of whether an epidemic would strike was still unanswered, there had never been a major antigenic shift in flu virus that had not been followed by an epidemic [54] . Wolfe charged Cooper was telling only half the story: several sporadic outbreaks of the new flu as well as antigenic shift had to precede an epidemic [55] . Six years earlier, Walter Dowdle of the CDC had written that antigenic shifts were not always followed by epidemics, and he concluded that antigenic shift alone was insufficient to cause epidemics. Kilbourne Sabin advocated immediate immunization of high-risk groups only, including the elderly and chronically ill for whom flu could be fatal. He recommended stockpiling the rest until potency requirements were known and a safe vaccine were developed for children [56] .
Salk followed Sabin and argued unequivocally in favor of the program as it was set up. He spoke for preventive medicine and filling the immunity gap, and said Americans should see the results of biomedical research they have been funding [57] .
Three articles in Lancet added to the conflicting scientific opinions. They disputed the seriousness of the threat and the efficacy of flu vaccines. One reported an experiment in which six volunteers were inoculated with the new virus. All became infected but had only mild reactions. In addition, the virus did not seem disposed to spread since when introduced into a closed community of young people it did not replace Victoria virus as the prevalent strain [58] .
Another British scientist disputed the 1918 analogy. The ability to cause disease is carried by viral genes separate from those determining surface antigens. Comparison of surface antigens therefore says little about virulence [59] .
A physician concluded the virus was not very good at infecting man. Since only 500 out of 12,000 recruits at Ft. Dix got swine flu, and none were immune to it, the infection stopped spreading long before all those susceptible had been infected [60] .
What could Congress do with conflicting expert opinion? Perhaps if it had been heard in April Congress would have approved a less ambitious program. But now there was more concern with keeping the program running than with going back to question its rationale. And there remained the nagging doubt that there might be a deadly epidemic. Kennedy supposedly said, "I hate this bill. But what if there is a swine flu epidemic? They'll blame me."
Even Wolfe, opposing the program for medical reasons and charging it would immunize people for whom the risk exceeded the benefit, realized Congress would not revoke its original decision. The legislators were trying to salvage as much of the program as possible, set precedents for other public health efforts, and place swine flu in the context of other health legislation. It might have accomplished this by making the program a vehicle for a comprehensive immunization program for childhood diseases.
The issue embodying all three concerns was the liability question. Insurers refused to write policies on the swine flu vaccine. The drug companies would not release vaccine without liability coverage. They worried not about injury from the vaccine (medical risks to adults were near zero) but about a spate of baseless damage suits that would cost a fortune to litigate. They estimated legal costs could reach $25 billion [61] .
The liability dispute threatened to stop the program before it began. According to the insurance industry, however, withdrawal of coverage was the effect and not the cause of the program's problems. They claimed that coverage was withdrawn because of the scale of the program: when 210 million people are to receive an unknown vaccine it is impossible to make any sensible risk assessment or to avoid a flood of spurious suits alleging injury from the vaccine [62] .
Thus the medical issues impinged on the legal issues, which affected implementation of the program. If swine flu had been treated like any new viral strain, if health officials immunized high-risk groups first but were more circumspect about vaccinating an entire nation and had secured more data on the virus, then perhaps Congress would not have voted a huge program threatened by many meritless damage suits. Because medical evidence that might have restricted the program's scope was ignored, the legal issue arose. Liability raised more problems: it held up HEW's contract negotiations with the pharmaceutical firms, delaying production and distribution of vaccine.
Although insurance companies said they cancelled coverage for swine flu vaccine because of the large number of potential recipients, there was some suspicion that this was just the first step out of the unprofitable public health area.
But the insurers pointed to the program's high visibility and unprecedented scope and foresaw many allegations of injury. Whether they had merit or not, such suits cost a lot to defend. The government had made this flu program different from any other. In doing so it created problems no other had faced and set undesirable precedents for future public health legislation.
Congress' solution was for the government to assume primary liability. Claims would be filed exclusively against the U.S. If the government lost the suit due to a drug company's negligence, it could sue the company to recover damages awarded by the court. The program participants, from the vaccine manufacturers to the nurses swabbing the arms of patients, were liable only for damages caused by their own negligence but were protected from the cost of defending baseless damage suits [63] .
The bill establishing the swine flu program and liability coverage passed both the House and Senate on August 10, 1976 , and was signed into law by President Ford two days later. But the plan still faced so many problems that Rogers held further hearings on September 13. The liability question had delayed the program six weeks; two companies had slowed or stopped vaccine production because the CDC had failed to specify the number of doses it required and had been late in delivering formula and labeling specifications. Medical questions, including potency measurements and the antibody level needed to provide immunity, were still unresolved.
Because the biological nature of the vaccine was unsuitable for everyone in the population, Cooper conceded they no longer hoped to vaccinate everyone.
His prediction was good. The program began October 1. By October 11 three people had died after receiving the inoculation and by the thirteenth 35 people in 17 states had died [64] . The But the program did worse than fail. It set back the relationship between the federal government and state health agencies, private practitioners, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and the private health insurance industry. As the administration tries to put together a national health insurance bill, these relationships must be strengthened, not broken. The swine flu failure may also have increased public mistrust of immunization programs in particular and of preventive medicine in general. As the public loses confidence in the scientific competence of the agencies of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, it resists warnings on the carcinogenicity of saccharin, the uselessness of laetrile.
Why such far-reaching consequences from a well-intentioned program that seemed to have no risks, that wagered an insignificant supplemental appropriation against the threat of widespread illness and death from swine flu? Its scope and the speed with which the program was implemented were inappropriate to the threat. Instead of immunizing only high-risk groups for whom flu can be fatal, HEW planned to immunize every man, woman, and child in America. It planned a program of unprecedented size because it felt the nation had the scientific and organizational capacity to make it succeed.
But its size magnified every one of its faults-the errors resulting from crash production of vaccine, the inability to make a vaccine safe for children, the refusal of private insurers to provide liability coverage for the vaccine, the lack of enthusiasm for the program shown by private physicians.
Its scope was justified by arguments of capability, necessity, and opportunity. But capability was less than expected. Local health agencies were short of funds and manpower; medical data on flu and flu vaccine were incomplete; a safe children's vaccine eluded the drug firms. Necessity was questioned both by American physicians like Albert Sabin and Sidney Wolfe and by the British health establishment represented in Lancet. The opportunity presented by the isolation of a new viral strain seven months before the flu season was a questionable base on which to establish the ambitious program.
The urgency given the program by HEW pressured Congress into a hasty decision. It neglected the opinions of consumer advocates and state health officials, and felt it could not afford to waste time studying how to include immunizations against childhood diseases in the swine flu program. Including such a provision might have salvaged at least part of the program even if the swine flu part failed.
The failure of the swine flu program shows the dangers of reaching too-quick decisions, of a vision so narrow it considers only a program's direct medical costs and benefits and is blind to its social and political ramifications for future health policy, of enthusuastic support for a public health project whose scientific basis is weak and whose organizational and administrative requirements are untested.
